Many social dilemmas exhibit nonlinearities and equilibrium outcomes in the interior of the choice space. This paper reports a laboratory experiment studying whether peer punishment promotes socially efficient behavior in such environments, which have been ignored in most experimental studies of peer punishment. It compares the effectiveness of peer punishment in a linear public good game to the effectiveness of this decentralized enforcement mechanism in two nonlinear social dilemma games: a piecewise linear public good game and a common pool resource game. While peer punishment improves cooperation in these new environments, the impact of punishment is weaker and takes longer to be effective.
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Introduction
Costly peer punishment to promote cooperation in social dilemmas such as public goods provision is an important, influential and well-studied phenomenon in experimental economics.
Peer punishment has been the focus of extensive research, sparked by Fehr and Gaechter (2000) . (Chaudhuri (2011) provides a recent survey.) Allowing individuals to punish their peers for socially bad behavior can improve cooperation in groups and sometimes allow them to achieve more efficient outcomes in social dilemmas by instilling positive social norms (Ostrom, 1990) .
Norm enforcement by peers rather than a centralized authority could therefore reduce social inefficiencies, and this suggests that self-governance can replace costly enforcement of regulations in some circumstances. While many studies have followed the Fehr and Gaechter (2000) approach and constructed a body of knowledge about the impact and robustness of alternative peer punishment institutions, very few have deviated from the simplified linear environment reported in this seminal paper. Smith (1989) distinguishes between institutions and environments and how this distinction suggests new directions for economic theory inspired by experimental results. This highlights that once an empirical result has been established, robustness should be evaluated across a variety of environments, rather than only focusing on institutional variation within the same environment. Canonical environments can be potentially misleading and as researchers we are encouraged to progress beyond incremental modifications to address legitimate generalizability and robustness concerns. Our paper is a step in that direction. This is an opportune time as the literature on peer punishment is mature enough for researchers to explore alternative environments. In particular, this paper examines whether peer punishment promotes socially efficient behavior in environments that exhibit nonlinearities and equilibrium outcomes in the interior of the choice space. We find that peer punishment improves cooperation in these new environments, but the impact of punishment is weaker and takes longer to become effective. Ostrom et al. (1992) report the first influential experiment on peer-punishment. Although they found that peer-punishment had some impact on behavior, it was quite ineffective when introduced in isolation. Ostrom et al. highlight this by summarizing, "…covenants, even without a sword, have some force, while swords without a covenant may be worse than the state of nature" (page 414, emphasis added). While this paper is frequently cited, the main result that peer punishment only reduced free-riding when it was combined with communication is overshadowed by the more prominent interpretation that peer punishment helps to resolve social dilemmas. The interpretation that Ostrom et al. show that peer punishment alone increases cooperation in public goods contribution is inaccurate, as the authors emphasize in their book providing more detail on the experimental results (Ostrom et al. 1994) .
1 This early study, however, incorporates peer punishment differently than most of the subsequent literature. For example, subjects in Ostrom et al. could only punish one peer per period, they participated in relatively large groups (n=8), and they could not vary their intensity of punishment.
The Ostrom et al. (1992) and Fehr and Gaechter (2000) studies initiated the broad literature on decentralized mechanisms for groups to address social dilemmas, but they employ specific environmental features that exist in distinct sub-literatures. Both are public goods provision problems, but Ostrom et al. is based on the Common Pool Resource (CPR) environment with nonlinear payoff functions, while Fehr and Gaechter's study is based on the linear Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM). The effectiveness of peer-punishment for improving cooperation, even without communication, is seen to be a robust empirical finding in the VCM sub-literature, and researchers have explored variations in the strength, relative cost, type, and information available for punishment. Surprisingly, however, almost no research has examined the robustness of these results to alternative nonlinear environments such as the CPR setting. 2 For some reason, the compelling results of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) for the simple linear VCM environment steered research on decentralized peer punishment away from other realistic nonlinear settings.
This study aims to address this gap in the literature by examining the effectiveness of costly peer-punishment in a richer set of environments that include nonlinearities. For many social dilemmas in practice, equilibrium and socially optimal choices are not on the boundaries of the choice space. The linear structure employed in nearly all previous experiments leads to the starkest kind of social dilemma because it leads to boundary predictions, where the sociallyoptimal and self-interested (Nash equilibrium) outcomes are at the extreme opposite locations in the choice set. This makes noncooperative behavior easy to identify for targeting punishment.
Nonlinear environments may be considered as more representative of many practical situations, since they typically lead to interior equilibrium outcomes and most social dilemmas in the field feature non-zero self-interested contributions but socially-optimal choices that do not devote all resources to the public good. As we discuss in the next section, nonlinear environments are common for social dilemmas in the field, such as when firms in an industry decide on production 2 Three exceptions are reported in Casari and Plott (2003) , Vyrastekova (2006), and Janssen et al. (2010) . Casari and Plott show that punishment improves cooperation, but for a special (historical) institution in which successful punishers receive the "fines" paid by the punished. van Soest and Vyrastekova employ a quadratic CPR and compare reward and punishment mechanisms. Peer punishment is observed to be more effective than rewards in improving cooperation. Janssen et al. do not find punishment to be effective in increasing cooperation in a CPR game with complex spatial and temporal dynamics. levels or when researchers decide how much time and effort to spend on their own research versus others' research via referring or mentoring.
Our experiment studies behavior in linear and nonlinear social dilemma games with and without costly punishment opportunities, integrating these two sub-literatures in an otherwise identical institution (e.g., identical choice space, matching, feedback, etc.). The linear VCM design is used as a baseline treatment. A nonlinear VCM treatment features a piecewise linear private return such that the marginal per capita return decreases for greater contributions to the public good. A CPR treatment (in which higher contributions imply harm to the group rather than benefit) introduces nonlinearities in the group return similar to Ostrom et al. (1992) , but with punishment introduced in a more "standard" way used in recent research.
Our results provide the first clear evidence that peer punishment can effectively reduce free-riding in nonlinear environments. 3 The experiment shows that the main conclusions of the peer punishment literature are observed in new and more complex environments, including nonlinear private or nonlinear public returns, and when reversing whether "allocations to the public account" create positive or negative externalities on others. Importantly, however, we also find that the impact of punishment is weaker and takes more time to emerge in the nonlinear environments. This is particularly so in the VCM treatment where the private returns are nonlinear. The magnitude of punishment's impact on cooperation is also smaller in the CPR treatment than in the linear VCM, with outcomes often closer to the Nash equilibrium than the 3 While van Soest and Vyrastekova (2006) use a quadratic CPR and punishment technology similar to the present study, and find that peer punishment improves cooperation, their results are unable to establish a clear causal link between peer punishment and improved cooperation. Punishment opportunities are always introduced after rounds without punishment in their design, so the marginal impact of punishment cannot be identified independently from learning and the time trend towards more cooperation. In addition, as mentioned in the previous footnote the focus of their work in on the relative effectiveness of rewards and punishment. In contrast to their paper, our study can isolate the causal effect of peer punishment independent of learning and we also compare different nonlinear environments.
social optimum even when punishment is available. We attribute this to differences in the benefits of cooperation and gains from defection across the environments.
Recent evidence from field experiments is consistent with our finding that there are limits to the impact of peer punishment. Noussair et al. (2011) show that punishment and rewards fail to improve cooperation amongst members of a recreational fishing community in a framed field experiment. Balafoutas and Nikiforakis (2012) find that the rate of enforcement of social norms is low in a natural field experiment. These new studies highlight how little we know about the usefulness of punishment and its role in self-governance in the field, and interpretation of data from natural field settings is complicated because the characteristics of the game may be unclear both to the players and the researcher. Lab experiments can improve our understanding of the effectiveness and limitations of peer-punishment by carefully isolating behavior that affects cooperation in different settings.
Public Good Dilemmas in Nonlinear Environments
The social dilemma studied in economics as the public good problem has been modeled in many different ways. It is essentially an externality problem in which agents allocate scarce resources, and some allocations benefit the decision-maker while other allocations benefit others.
Individuals who focus on their own benefits and costs ignore the externality that their allocation imposes on others' benefits and costs, and so the self-interested allocation is socially inefficient.
This general description does not specify the relative sizes of the benefits and costs, and in fact many different economic environments feature this classic social dilemma. While standard theoretical models of this problem do not assume specific functional forms, for convenience most of the experimental literature has used constant benefits and costs, which leads to a linear payoff structure that is simple to describe to experimental subjects. As noted in the introduction, this linear special case has been used almost exclusively in the literature on public goods provision with peer punishment. This is typically called the linear Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM), characterized by the following payoff function:
The parameters , , , denote (respectively) a fixed payment, the endowment that agent i is to allocate, returns to the endowment not allocated to the public good, and the returns to allocations towards the public good. The agent's choice variable is , the amount of the endowment to contribute to the public good. This payoff function represents a social dilemma if
. The first inequality implies that individual returns from the public good are lower than private returns, so that zero public good contribution is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium. The second inequality implies that total returns received by the group from any public good allocation exceed the private returns, so the social optimum is for every agent to contribute all resources to the public good. The ratio / is usually referred to as the marginal per-capita return (MPCR) (Isaac and Walker, 1988) .
Clearly this representation of the social dilemma with constant and linear returns is a special case, and since the unique Nash equilibrium ( * 0) and the social optimum ( . .
)
are at extreme ends of the choice space it is likely to make free-riding particularly easy to identify. This could significantly facilitate agents' ability to use decentralized peer punishment to enforce social norms of high contributions, and indeed Fehr and Gaechter (2000) document that a large fraction of individual contributions reach the social optimum of . .
in their fixed groups ("partners") treatment.
Many social dilemma and public goods provision problems encountered in the field, however, do not have this "all-or-nothing" structure where self-interest and socially-optimal outcomes are at the extremes of the available choice space. Economic problems often have equilibria and socially-efficient outcomes that are in the interior of the choice space, such as Cournot quantity choice games to take a prominent example from the field of Industrial Organization. It is also not hard to think of simple examples from everyday life, such as the amount of journal refereeing or uninspiring committee service effort that academics contribute to the public good. For many people a zero contribution of effort is not optimal, even for those who are strictly self-interested, since this service provides private as well as public benefits. Moreover, devoting all of one's efforts towards these activities is clearly not socially optimal as the costs of contribution are convex. Many social dilemmas share characteristics of this example and therefore feature equilibria and efficient allocations that are on the interior of the choice space.
The linear VCM could be modified in a variety of ways to move the self-interested equilibrium and socially-efficient outcomes to the interior. One simple way is to make the private and/or public returns  and  non-constant. This is an approach used by Sefton and Steinberg (1996) , for example, who employ decreasing marginal returns to the public good in one treatment to induce non-dominant strategy Nash equilibria in the interior, and decreasing marginal private returns in another treatment to create a unique interior dominant strategy Nash equilibrium. Isaac and Walker (1998) use simple quadratic public good returns to generate interior equilibria. In the most simple nonlinear environment we employ, described in the next section in more detail, we adapt the piecewise linear private returns used in Bracha et al. (2011) that lead to a dominant strategy unique interior Nash equilibrium and an interior social optimum.
A richer but more complex way to introduce nonlinearities is the Common Pool Resource (CPR) environment studied by Ostrom et al. (1992) . As in the linear VCM, allocations to a "private account" have a constant rate of return. Allocations to a "public account" represent effort exerted in extracting from a CPR, and therefore the group return obtained by an agent depends on the total allocations to the group account by all agents with access to the CPR. For example, in a congested fishery the total catch depends on the total effort exerted in the group, Besides adding some realism, there are several other reasons why studying decentralized peer punishment in this version of the social dilemma is important. As in the environments discussed above, it leads to Nash equilibria that are in the interior of the choice space, and are not in dominant strategies. Thus, also more realistically, a self-interested individual's allocations to the public good depend on the allocations made by others. This also makes the equilibria, and the (interior) social-optimum, more challenging to identify, so the levels of free riding and cooperation are less transparent. Consequently, enforcing social norms of cooperation through peer punishment may become more demanding (Reuben and Riedl, 2013) .
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Perhaps more importantly, this CPR environment creates a more challenging setting for cooperation since the payoff gains to deviating from a cooperative allocation are greater, and the ability of a subgroup of agents to gain from mutual cooperation are weaker, compared to the VCM environment. Gains to cooperation and benefits of defection are known to influence the frequency of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium play, as Isaac and Walker (1988) discovered for the linear public goods environment when they identified the important influence of the MPCR on cooperation and free-riding. In our experiment fixed groups of 4 individuals interacted for a known number of (10) periods. In the VCM, cooperators can "tolerate" free riding by one individual and still reap substantial gains from cooperation over these periods. For the parameters implemented in the experiment, a subset of 3 cooperators can increase their payoffs by 19 percent in the linear and nonlinear VCM environments, although of course the free rider benefits even more from the others' cooperative public good contributions. In the CPR, however, the free rider can extract nearly all of the gains from the others' cooperation because public good returns are determined by agents' share of total allocations. For the CPR parameters used in the present experiment a set of cooperators can increase their payoffs by only 1 or 2 percent if just a single self-interested agent free rides on their cooperation. In other versions of the CPR and other social dilemmas (e.g., the centipede game), cooperation must be unanimous for cooperators to receive positive returns (e.g., Murphy et al., 2006) .
The share-based returns to the public good also create much higher gains to an agent who defects from a cooperative agreement in the CPR, relative to the VCM. In the two versions of the VCM used in our experiment, deviating from the social optimum with a best-response public good allocation (which is a dominant strategy in these cases) raises the deviator's payoff by 14 percent. These gains can be easily taken away from the deviator by a single peer punisher who incurs punishment costs for only a single period. By contrast, in the CPR a deviator can extract most of the public good returns, raising her payoff by 43 percent. Thus, the gains from defection are tripled in the CPR relative to the VCM. While these specific figures are based on the particular parameters chosen for this experiment, these structural differences in payoffs between the two environments exist in virtually all implementations of these social dilemmas in experimental studies. Thus it is plausible that peer punishment may not increase cooperation in nonlinear public goods settings such as the CPR.
Experimental Design
The experiment includes six different treatments: three environments summarized in Table 1, each conducted with and without peer punishment opportunities. The design is unorthodox, but necessary whenever the environments considered are not nearly identical. Unlike standard treatment comparisons that change only one characteristic at a time, the comparisons of this study necessitate changes in multiple factors to reflect the underlying change in the environment.
As noted at the bottom of the table, however, all institutional features were kept fixed across all sessions, including the use of n=4 individuals per group, 10 periods of fixed-group repetition, and a strategy space of g i {0, 1, …, 11, 12} tokens that could be allocated to the group or the private account. The framing used in the instructions was similar to that in the literature and it was maintained exactly consistent across all treatments. We also chose parameters so that the payoff gain to cooperation was (approximately) equal across the three environments, since we are primarily interested in how peer punishment can promote cooperation. We also made the maximum gains to defection from the social optimum approximately equal across the two VCM environments. This helps in the interpretation of the results.
The linear VCM environment we employ is standard and serves as the baseline. The MPCR is 0.5 and the Nash equilibrium of zero contributions to the public good for own-payoff maximizing agents is in dominant strategies. As noted in the previous section, the nonlinear VCM employs a piecewise linear private return so that the Nash equilibrium (a per-subject contribution of 3 tokens to the public good) is also in dominant strategies. The MPCR is 1.25 for the first 3 tokens, 0.5 for the next 7 tokens, and 0.2 for the final 2 tokens contributed to the group account. 5 The low MPCR for the final 2 tokens moves the social optimum to the interior of the choice space, and corresponds to each subject contributing 10 of her 12 tokens to the public good.
In the CPR environment subjects also had to allocate 12 tokens to the group and their private account. In this environment, however, an allocation to the group account (although not framed to the subjects this way) creates negative externalities as it is effort spent extracting from a common pool resource. The instructions explained that "If a total of X tokens are placed in the group account by group members, then the total group payoff is 18X-0.4X 2 Experimental Dollars"
and that "Your share of this total group payoff equals your number of tokens placed in the group account as a fraction of the total tokens you and the others in your group place in the group account." This explanation was followed by numerical examples, and as shown in the instructions Appendix, the total group returns were displayed numerically on the subjects' input screens. Group returns, as well as each subject's share of the group returns, were also displayed on the input screens in the two VCM treatments. 5 In the instructions subjects were told that "Your first 2 tokens provide a payoff of 5 Experimental Dollars each. Tokens 3 to 9 provide a payoff of 2 Experimental Dollars each. Tokens 10, 11 and 12 provide a payoff of 0.8 Experimental Dollars each."
The experiment employed quadratic group returns, consistent with the CPR literature following Ostrom et al. (1992) . It is straightforward to show that the Nash equilibrium total group investment G is [n/(n+1)](a-w)/b, where n is the number of group members (4), w is the return to tokens retained in the private account (2), and a and b are coefficients of the group return function (18 and 0.4). It is also easy to show that the socially optimal group investment is (a-w)/2b. Therefore, the ratio of the Nash equilibrium allocation to the social optimum allocation is completely determined by the number of group members n in this quadratic case: 2n/(n+1). As the number of group members increases the externality caused by greater extraction increases, causing a larger divergence between the group and individually optimal extraction levels.
Because we kept the number of group members fixed across environments at n=4, the ratio of Nash equilibrium allocation to the social optimum allocation was fixed at 1.6; specifically, allocations of 8 and 5 for our parameter choices.
Although the range between the equilibrium and socially optimal allocations is smaller in the CPR than in the two VCM environments, as noted above due to the nature of the different payoff functions subjects' gains from deviating from the social optimum are substantially larger for the CPR. Figure 1 shows that deviations from the social optimum allow the deviator to increase his payoff by at most 6 or 7 experimental dollars in the two VCM environments. By contrast, in the CPR a deviator can place all of his tokens in the group account (i.e., devoting all available effort to resource extraction) and increase his payoff by 22.4 experimental dollars.
Thus, the temptation to defect from the social optimum is over three times higher in the CPR, which could make coordination on this group optimum considerably more difficult. Since the incentives to deviate from the cooperative allocation are very similar in the two VCM environments, the comparison of outcomes across environments will help reveal whether any differences are due to non-linearities per se or to the stronger incentives to deviate in the CPR relative to the nonlinear VCM environment.
In exactly half of the sessions and groups, subjects had only one decision each period:
how many tokens to allocate to the group account. The other half of the sessions added a second decision stage each period, in which subjects observed the allocations by all individuals in their group and had an opportunity to assign "deduction points" to others. The framing used to explain this feature to subjects is standard in the peer punishment public goods literature, and was taken from Gaechter et al. (2008) . Each deduction point cost the assigner 1 experimental dollar, but it reduced the target's payoff by 3 experimental dollars. A subject could assign up to 5 deduction points to each of the other 3 group members, for a maximum of 15 points. Potentially a subject could receive 15 deduction points, resulting in a payoff loss of 45 experimental dollars. Payoffs could be negative in a given period, although this was uncommon. Subjects did not know who assigned deduction points to them, and the order that individual contributions were displayed was randomly shuffled each period so that subjects could not acquire individual reputations.
These design choices are also standard in the peer punishment public goods literature.
All sessions were conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory at Purdue University, using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Subjects were drawn from the undergraduate student population, broadly recruited across the university by email using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . Although some had participated in other economics experiments, all were inexperienced in the sense that they had never participated in a similar experiment featuring public goods or common pool resource characteristics and incentives. While subjects interacted anonymously in 4-person fixed groups, multiple groups under the same treatment conditions were conducted simultaneously in the laboratory, employing 16 to 24 subjects in each session.
The final row of Table 1 shows the number of groups and subjects in each environment treatment.
Subjects were randomly assigned to different groups upon arrival, and they remained in those positions throughout the experiment. Subjects made decisions in one or two stages as described above, depending on the treatment. They participated in 10 periods and this number of periods was common knowledge and announced in the instructions. 6 At the beginning of each experimental session an experimenter read the instructions aloud while subjects followed along on their own copy. All accumulated experimental dollars were converted to U.S. dollars at a preannounced 40-to-1 conversion rate and paid in cash at the conclusion of the experimental session.
The 272 subjects earned US$19.75 each on average, with an interquartile range of $18.00 to $21.75. Including the instruction and payment distribution time, sessions usually lasted about one hour.
Results
We report the results in five subsections, corresponding to five key results. The first two subsections compare contributions and overall efficiency in the three environments, with and without punishment opportunities. The third subsection compares end-period contributions for the two nonlinear environments with their interior equilibrium predictions. The fourth subsection documents similarities in punishment behavior across all environments, and the final subsection explores whether contributors could profitably deviate from cooperative contribution levels given the observed punishment behavior.
6 An additional 10 periods were conducted following this as a "surprise restart," either adding or removing punishment depending on the condition used initially, but since results were very similar in these restart periods we do not report them here. The data and statistical tests reported in the paper are all based on between-subject comparisons that employ only the initial 10 periods.
Contributions
Result 1: (Contributions) Contributions are significantly higher with punishment opportunities than without in all three environments, although the impact of punishment is weaker and requires more time to emerge in the nonlinear environments.
Support: Figure 2 summarizes the average contributions to the group account in the three environments, reported separately for the treatments with and without punishment opportunities.
Panel A shows that the experiment replicates the standard result for the linear VCM environment that contributions begin at approximately half of the endowment, but they fall gradually without peer punishment opportunities and rise over time when subjects can punish. (As we document below in Subsection 4.4, the free-riders are the individuals who are typically punished.) Panel B
indicates relatively steady average contributions in the nonlinear VCM for the first 5 or 6 periods, before contributions diverge in the punishment and non-punishment treatments. By the tenth period, average contributions are 57 percent higher with punishment opportunities than without.
Panel C illustrates that contributions also begin near the midpoint of the choice interval (6) in both CPR treatments. "Contributions" after the first few periods tend to be lower when punishment is available, and in this environment these lower contributions provide a positive externality to others in the group. Table 2 indicates that the differences in average contributions across the punishment and non-punishment treatments are highly significant for the linear environment, considering either all 10 periods or only the last 5 periods. (The nonparametric Wilcoxon tests reported in the lowest row employ one observation-the average contribution-from each statistically independent group of 4 subjects.) Consistent with the visual impression of Figure 2 , treatment effects due to punishment do not emerge in the nonlinear VCM until the last 5 periods. Since the gains to cooperation and the gains to defection are almost identical in the linear and nonlinear VCM environments (see Table 1 ), this finding that cooperation takes longer to emerge in the nonlinear VCM is likely due to the nonlinearities per se and the resulting interior location of the Nash equilibrium and social optimum. Contributions are significantly different between the punishment and no punishment conditions in the CPR environment, although near the conventional margin of 5-percent both for all periods and in the late periods. The magnitude of the punishment influence is also smaller in this environment. Recall, however, that the range of the expected contributions between the Nash equilibrium and the Social Optimum is compressed in the CPR (8 -5) relative to the nonlinear VCM (3 -10) and especially to the standard linear VCM (0 -12). To account for the different expected contribution ranges across treatments, we also calculated a 0-to-1 index to assess the change in contributions when peer-punishment is allowed -normalizing by the predicted difference in the contributions in the Nash and the Social Optimum. The results based on this index provide identical conclusions (so we do not report them here) and confirm that punishment is least effective across all periods in the nonlinear VCM.
Efficiency
As highlighted originally in Ostrom et al. (1992) , the deadweight losses from costly peer punishment can significantly erode gains from improved cooperation of public good contributions. In order to compare efficiency with and without punishment across the three environments, we employ an index based on realized payoffs, denoted , compared to environment-specific Nash equilibrium and socially optimal payoffs, denoted and . . .
These realized payoffs include losses incurred when assigning and receiving punishment points.
The efficiency index is . .
This index varies between 0 and 1 as payoffs vary between levels earned at the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum.
Result 2: (Efficiency) Efficiency is not significantly different with and without punishment opportunities in any of the three environments. Figure 3 summarizes the average efficiency in the three environments, with separate averages reported for the treatments with and without punishment opportunities. In all three panels efficiency is lower initially in the punishment condition, but eventually rises to reach or 
Support:
Equilibrium and Social Optimum Benchmarks
In the large literature on the linear VCM game, Nash equilibrium and Social Optimum contribution levels are at the boundaries of the choice space and therefore contributions are always between these theoretical benchmarks-as illustrated in our data in Panel A of Figure 2 .
Since deviations from these benchmarks are necessarily one-sided, statistical tests can typically reject those theoretical predictions easily. The interior benchmarks in our nonlinear environments, however, allow contributions to be above and below the equilibrium and social optimum targets so it is reasonable to compare behavior to these theoretical predictions statistically. 
Punishment Behavior
In Section 2 we conjectured that because adding nonlinearities to the payoff function makes the environment more complex, it could also become less transparent to subjects what contributions correspond to self-interested and socially-efficient behavior. One implication of this reduced transparency is that punishment may not be applied to those who impose negative externalities (or fail to provide positive externalities) on others. Subject reactions to being punished may also be more confused in the more complex, nonlinear settings. As we document in the next result, however, this is not the case.
Result 4: (Punishment) As in the standard linear environment, subjects apply punishment to strong free riders, and subjects who are punished in the new nonlinear VCM and CPR environments respond in the subsequent period by free riding less. No differences exist across environments in the levels or variance of punishment assigned.
Support: Average punishment points assigned by each subject typically range between 1 and 1.5
per period in the early periods, declining to below 1 in the later periods. The level of punishment assigned is never different across any of the three pairwise comparisons of treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests p-values range between 0.51 and 0.97). Figure 4 shows that subjects who deviate from the group norm (i.e., the group allocation chosen by the other group members) receive punishment points, and they change their contributions in response to receiving punishment. In particular, the left side of the figure shows that when subjects contributed below the group average in the linear (top panel) and nonlinear (middle panel) VCM, they receive a greater number of punishment points; moreover, greater deviations from the group average receive more punishment points. That is, those who fail to provide a positive externality to others are punished.
In the CPR (bottom panel) the opposite pattern is clearly evident, indicating that agents understood that contributions in this context impose a negative externality on others. These higher allocations (greater resource extraction) are punished, indicating that subjects did not find this environment too complex to identify group norms that should be enforced through punishment. The right side of this figure shows that subjects raised or lowered their group allocations to increase positive externalities in the subsequent period in response to receiving punishment, indicating that they were not confused about why they were punished. Table 3 provides statistical support for the conclusion that free-riders receive punishment in all three environments, using tobit regression models of the punishment received, similar to those in the literature (e.g., Fehr and Gaechter (2000) Table 5 ). The results confirm that negative (absolute) deviations from average group allocations result in significantly greater punishment in the two VCM environments, and in the CPR environment positive deviations are punished. Our subjects do not exercise systematic anti-social punishment, i.e., sanction individuals who behave pro-socially and punish positive deviations in the VCM or punish negative deviations in the CPR. Table 4 reports regressions to explore how subjects react to being punished by changing contribution levels in the immediate subsequent period (as in Masclet et al. (2003) Table 4 ). The models are estimated separately for subjects who contributed above and below the mean contribution for a given period. All six models show a strong negative relationship between a subject's deviation from the average contribution of her group, indicating a strong tendency to choose contributions closer to others' contributions. (This is frequently referred to as conditional cooperation.) Controlling for this movement towards the mean, punishment significantly raises contributions among low contributors in the nonlinear VCM and it significantly lowers extraction among high extractors in the CPR.
Profitable Deviations from Cooperative Benchmarks
As discussed in Section 3, the CPR environment has substantially stronger potential gains of defection from the socially-optimal level of contribution/extraction, relative to the two VCM settings. As just documented in the previous subsection, however, free-riders and defectors received punishment from their peers. As indicated in our final result, this can eliminate most or even all of the gains from defection based on the level of cooperation that emerged in all environments.
Result 5: (Profitable Deviations) When including the average punishment costs received, deviations from the social optimum are potentially profitable only in the CPR environment.
However coordinating at an extraction level that marginally exceeds the social optimum allows subjects to essentially eliminate these positive returns from defection.
Support: For the two VCM environments, as shown earlier in Figure 1 the greatest potential gain from an individual deviation from the social optimum is 6 or 7 experimental dollars. Subjects must contribute considerably less than others to maximize their own (one-period static) payoff when deviating from the social optimum. Such large deviations are punished severely, however, on average by a payoff reduction of about 20 experimental dollars. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 5 on average they obtain a post-punishment reduction in net payoff of 10 or more experimental dollars when deviating to full free riding. The figure indicates that no deviations from the social optimum are on average profitable in the two VCM environments after subtracting received punishment costs.
Gains from defection are larger in the CPR, and the punishment assigned to free-riders is not sufficient to offset the payoffs from deviating from the social optimum. For example, consider a subject who increases extraction from the cooperative level of 5 to 10. This extraction of 10 corresponds to private account tokens that are reduced towards the left to 2 on the horizontal axis of Figure 5 . The figure indicates that a subject could increase his net payment by over 10 experimental dollars on average. This makes cooperation to restrict extraction to 5 units per subject difficult to sustain. Hence we would expect subjects to deviate from the social optimum.
As shown earlier in Figure 2 (Panel C), however, mean extraction levels exceed 5 even when punishment is possible. In particular, for the CPR treatment with punishment, only 10 percent of the individual extraction levels were at the social optimum of 5. The most frequent extraction was 6, chosen 35 percent of the time, and the modal extraction was 6 in every period.
The data do suggest some failed attempts to coordinate on the social optimum of 5, since the fraction of choices on 5 falls in half from periods 1-4 to periods 5-10. Although cooperation on an extraction level of 6 rather than 5 is suboptimal, it permits subjects to earn nearly the same level of profit (50.4) as the 52 earned at the social optimum. Importantly, this suboptimal extraction level of 6 substantially reduces the incentives to deviate, typically by 10 to 12
experimental dollars. Figure 5 shows that the gains from deviating from this suboptimal cooperation level of 6 are barely positive.
Conclusion
This paper explores the effectiveness of peer punishment in promoting cooperation in social dilemmas with nonlinear environments. While a large literature exists on peer punishment in public good games, nearly all of these studies consider the special context of linear VCMs.
Nonlinear environments are at least if not more relevant in field applications. The interior solutions in nonlinear environments make it more difficult for agents to identify the equilibria and the gains to cooperation through peer punishment. By studying the impact of peer punishment in this largely neglected class of social dilemma games, our paper significantly strengthens the confidence in key conclusions drawn from this literature and provides a novel contribution that helps enhance the external validity of experimental results on informal peer sanctions.
We can highlight four key results from the experiment reported here. First, the availability of punishment opportunities does increase cooperation in nonlinear VCM and CPR environments. This finding for the CPR stands in contrast to Ostrom et al. (1992) , which concluded that communication between subjects was also necessary to improve cooperation.
That early study employed a considerably more restrictive form of peer punishment relative to the subsequent literature. Punishment effectiveness is low in our data, however, and outcomes are closer to the Nash equilibrium than the social optimum even when agents are allowed to punish their peers. In addition, in the nonlinear VCM, contributions do not increase significantly when considering all time periods. The impact of peer punishment takes longer to appear and is only observed in later periods, even though nonlinearity was introduced in the simplest possible way. This suggests that long-run efficiency benefits of punishment (Gaechter et al., 2008) may be delayed or never realized with certain nonlinearities. The nonlinear VCM is the only treatment with nonlinear private returns, indicating that nonlinear private returns may make the benefits of cooperation more difficult to understand. 7 In such cases, social norms promoting cooperation may need to be supplemented by external private incentives. In the academic refereeing example above, this could correspond to monetary incentives provided by some journals or excellence in refereeing awards to encourage timely and good quality reports.
Second, similar to the linear VCM treatment, in our new nonlinear treatments the increase in cooperation does not generate a high enough return to compensate for the costs of punishment. Efficiency is therefore not improved by the availability of punishment in all environments studied here for this ten-period horizon. Third, as is also seen in the linear VCM, in the new environments individuals punish strong free riders and no difference exists in the levels or variance of punishment assigned. Finally, gains from defecting are higher in the CPR treatment and punishment levels observed are not sufficient to support the socially optimal level of extraction. Subjects often implement suboptimal levels of extraction, however, which reduce the gains from defection so that cooperation can be enforced effectively through peer punishment.
The impact of punishment in nonlinear environments such as the CPR has not been examined in depth before.
Overall, these results demonstrate that while peer punishment has similar influence on outcomes in the nonlinear environments, its impact is reduced and takes longer to emerge. This suggests that peer punishment could vary in its degree of effectiveness in different environments.
Our findings indicate that studying alternative environments helps improve our understanding of behavior in social dilemma games. Additional studies that explore the effectiveness and limitations of peer punishment would help reveal where results are relevant for important applications in the field. Groups/Subjects 20/80 24/96 24/96 Common features: n=4 individuals per group; 10 periods of repetition in fixed groups with known endpoint; strategy space tokens to allocate g i {0, 1, …, 11, 12}; all 3 others in group could be punished, assigning up to 5 deduction points to each; each point cost the assigner 1 E$ and reduced the recipient's payoff by 3 E$. 
Appendix: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS (CPR with Punishment)
This is an experiment on decision making. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. All earnings on your computer screens are in Experimental Dollars. These Experimental Dollars will be converted to real Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a rate of Experimental Dollars = 1 real Dollar.
Today's session will be conducted using the computer network located here in this laboratory. It will be divided into 10 different periods. Attached to these instructions you will find a sheet labeled Personal Record Sheet, which will help you keep track of your earnings based on the decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.
You have been assigned to a group of four (yourself and three other) participants. This will be your group for the entire session.
The First Stage
At the beginning of each period each participant receives an endowment of 12 tokens. In
Stage 1 each period you (and the others in your group) must decide how many tokens to place into either or both of 2 accounts: a private account and a group account. All tokens must be placed in one account or the other. Each token you place in the private account generates a return to you (independent of what anyone else does), and each token you place in the group account generates a return that depends on how many tokens that others in your group place in the group account. Your earnings in a period are the sum of your earnings from the private account and your earnings from the group account, minus 12. Returns to the two accounts are listed on your input screen as shown on the next page. Everybody has the same returns.
You and all the other members of your group will each get a share of the total group earnings that depends on your token placements. If a total of X tokens are placed in the group account by group members, then the total group payoff is 18X-0.4X 2 Experimental Dollars. For example, if a total of 10 tokens are placed in the group account, the total group payoff is (18×10)-(0.4×100)=180-40=140. This amount, along with every other possible total token placement in the group account are shown on your input screen below.
Your share of this total group payoff equals your number of tokens placed in the group account as a fraction of the total tokens you and the others in your group place in the group screen will show you the total amount of tokens placed in the group account by all four participants of your group (including you). Also this screen shows your earnings for the first stage of the period. Your earnings are the sum of your earnings from the private account and your earnings from the group account. During the experiment you will record this information on your hardcopy record sheet and then click the Continue button.
Detail of Results Screen for First Stage The Second Stage each Period
In the second stage you will see the amount of tokens placed in the group account by all four participants of your group. Moreover, in this stage you can decide whether to decrease the can also decrease your earnings if they wish to. This is apparent from the input screen at the second stage, shown below.
Your allocation to the group account is displayed in the first column, while the allocations to the group account by the other people are shown in the remaining three columns.
Note that the order in which others' allocations are displayed will be determined at random in every period. The allocation in the second column, for example, could represent a different person in different periods. The same holds true for the other two columns.
You will have to decide how many deduction points to assign to each of these other three participants in your group. You must enter a number for each of them. If you do not wish to change the earnings of a person in your group then you must enter 0. You can assign up to 5 points to each participant.
You will incur costs from assigning deduction points. Every deduction point you assign costs you 1 Experimental Dollar. For example, if you assign 2 deduction points to one person, this costs you 2 Experimental Dollars; if, in addition, you assign 4 deduction points to another person this costs you an additional 4 Experimental Dollars. In total for this example you will have assigned 6 points and your total costs therefore amount to 6 Experimental Dollars.
After you have assigned points to each of the other three participants you can click the button "Calculate" (see the second stage input screen). On the screen you will then see the total costs of your assigned points. As long as you have not yet clicked the Continue button, you can still change your decision. To recalculate the costs after a change of your assigned points, simply press the "Calculate" button again.
If you assign 0 deduction points to a particular participant (i.e., enter "0"), you will not alter his or her earnings. However, if you assign one deduction point to a participant you will decrease his or her earnings by 3 Experimental Dollars. If you assign a participant 2 deduction points you will decrease his or her earnings by 6 Experimental Dollars, and so on. Each deduction point that you assign to another person will reduce his or her earnings by 3
Experimental Dollars. Similarly, each deduction point assigned to you by another participant will reduce your first stage earnings by 3 Experimental Dollars:
Costs of received deduction points = 3 × Sum of received deduction points.
How much the earnings at the second stage are decreased depends on the sum of deduction points received. For instance, if somebody receives a total of 3 deduction points (from all other participants in this period), his or her earnings would be decreased by 9
Experimental Dollars. If somebody receives a total of 4 deduction points, his or her earnings are reduced by 12 Experimental Dollars.
Your total earnings from the two stages are therefore calculated as follows:
Total earnings at the end of the second stage = period earnings = = Earnings from the first stage -3 × (sum of received deduction points) -(sum of deduction points you have assigned) -12
Note that everyone has a fixed amount of 12 Experimental Dollars subtracted every period.
After all participants have made their decision, your earnings from the period will be displayed on a screen such as the one shown below. After you have viewed the earnings screen the period is over and the next period commences. Recall that 10 periods will be conducted.
Recording Rules
During every period you should write down the information shown on your results screens on your Personal Record Sheet. The Stage 1 results screen shows the group account allocations you should record, and the final earnings screen shows your Deduction Points and period earnings. Be sure to record your total earnings for each period in the rightmost column.
Summary
